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Unfortunately, many cryptographic protocols are
inherently incorrect, or at least cannot achieve the stated
aim. Some protocols were considered perfect at first, and
were found to contain flaws many years later [ 5 , 91. To
evaluate and verify security protocols effectively, people
always try to analyse the secure properties of these
protocols.

Abstract
Cryptographic protocols have been widely used to
protect coniniunicafions over insecure iietwork
eii viron nienis. Existing ciptogruph ic profocols usually
contain Jaws. To analyze these protocols and j n d
potential flaws in them, the secure properties of them
need be studied in depth. This paper attempts to provide
CI iiew fiumework to analyze and prove the secure
properties in these protocols. A nuniber of predicates
and action jiinctions are used to nrodel the network
coiwnrimication environment. Doniain rules are given to
describe the transitions of principals * knowledge and
belief states. An example of public key authentication
prorocois has been studied and analysed.
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In this paper, we propose a framework to analyse
the secure properties of cryptographic protocols. Our
framework is a knowledge-based logic inference system.

This paper first gives a summary of related work on
cryptographic protocol analysis, and then gives a detailed
description of our knowledge based framework.
Thereafter, we take the famous Needham-Schroeder
public key authentication protocol [9] as an example to
prove two important authentication properties. The last
section concludes the paper.

Introduction
2

Cryptographic algorithms have been widely used to
protect security of information going through networks,
especially insecure networks environment, of which the
Internet is the best example. Although there are a large
number of “good” cryptographic algorithms that are very
difficult to break, mere cryptography sometimes cannot
compktely protect anything if it is not used in an
appropriate way. To give guidelines to use cryptographic
technology, a large number of security protocols have
been used. These protocols do contribute greatly to
informati on security.
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Related Work

Since Burrows et al. proposed their famous BAN
logic [ 3 ] , designing formal methods for analyzing
cryptographic protocols has been a research highlight in
recent years, Much research work has been conducted in
this area and many good models and methods have been
proposed. Generally speaking, all these methods can be
broadly divided into two categories, namely state based
methods and rule based methods.
State based methods model security protocols as
finite state machines. They search the state space
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exhaustively to see whether all the reachable states are
safe [IO]. If some reachable state in a security protocol is
proved to be unsafe, a flaw may be reported; otherwise,
the protocol will be said to be correct and safe. State
based methods are efficient and usually can find attacks
quickly. Many attacks have been found by this kind of
methods. However, jt is difficult to effectively control
the size of the state space; when the protocol is large, the
state space will become surprisingly huge and it will be
extremeIy time consuming, or even practically
impossible, to search the whole space.

In the recent years, a number of rule based methods

and belief logics have been developed. Among them, the
BAN logic introduced by Burrows et al. [3] and
Bolignano’s model [2] are good representatives. In
addition, a special kind of rule based models are also
interesting. They construct proofs using specific rules.
Paulson’s inductive inference method [lo] serves as a
good example.

Famous state based methods include Lowe’s CSP
Method [5] and Meadows’ NRL Protocol Analyzer [7, 81.
In Lowe’s CSP Method, The Failure Divergences
Refinement (FDR)Checker is a model checker for CSP,
which is used to describe concurrent systems whose
component processes interact with each other. by
cominunication. In Lowe’s method, FDR takes two CSP
processes, namely a specification and an impIementation,
as input, and tests whether the implementation refines the
specification. It has been used to analyze many sorts of
systems, including communication protocols and
distributed databases. The NRL Protocol Analyzer
developed by Meadows [7, 81 is a prototype special
purpose verification tool, written in Prolog. As most
other authentication protocol verification methods, the
NRL Protocol Analyzer makes the assumption that
principals communicate over a network controlled by a
hostile intruder ‘who can read, modify and destroy traffic,
and atso perform some operations, such as encryption,
that are available to legitimate participants in the
protocols. It has been developed for the analysis of
cryptographic protocols that are used to authenticate
principals and services and distribute keys in a network.
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The BAN logic was proposed in 1989 and named
after its three creators: Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi
and Roger Needham [3]. Their aim to create this logic
was to provide a theoretical tool for formally analyzing
protocols for the authentication of principals in
distributed computing systems. It is actually the first and
probably the most well-known rule based method for
verifying security protocoIs, which began the research of
protocol formal verification. Bolignano’s approach 121 is
based on the use of general purpose formal methods. It is
complementary with belief logic methods as it allows for
a description of protocol, hypotheses and authentication
properties at a finer level of precision and with more
freedom. Paulson’s inductive method [TO] is also
impressive. He has introduced several message analysis
and .synthesis operators, namely purts, anaO and synth,
which can be inductively defined. These operators can be
used to.describe what information a principal can get and
produce from what he has known.

We also have proposed a framework [ti] to verify
cryptographic protocols, which is knowledge-based and
forms the basis of this paper.
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Rule based methods, also called belief logic
methods in some literatures, formally express what a
principal can infer from messages received [lo]. With
this approach, the protocols, the necessary assumptions
and the goals of the protocols are formulated in formal
logic. Some specific properties of the protocols can be
proved by using the axioms and rules of the logic [4].
Since rule based methods do not have to search IaTge
state space, they can normally converge very quickly in
less than one hundred steps for a medium sized protocol,
which is much more efficient than state exploration
methods, and they do have found many subtle flaws.
However, some of them only consider single runs of the
protocols and usually, ignore the interleaving of two or
more sessions. So .there are a lot of flaws which cannot
be found with these logics.

The knowledge based framework

Our framework is composed of a number of basic
notations, predicates, action functions, assumptions and
rules, which are described as follows.

3.1

Basic notations

Individuals taking part in network communications
are called prirzcipals, denoted with uppercase letters.
Conventionally, A , B, . .., stand for “honest” principals,
while I stands for the inhuder, or, in some literatures, the
adversary or the spy, which are synonyms in our context.

1

Random numbers chosen by principals serve as
nonces to identify protocol runs uniquely and avoid
replay attack [IO].Nonces are normally denoted as No,
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Accordingly, an action function Rcv(X, M ) means
that the principalXreceives the message A4 from another.

ii,,etc, where the subscripts imply the producers of the
nonces.

Every principal has some keys. In public key
cryptosystem, the principal A basically has a pziblic key
and a corresponding private key, which are denoted as KO
and K;’, respectively. On the other hand, in symmetric
key cryptosystem, two communicating principals A and
B normally share a session key, denoted as Kab.

3.4

Assumptions

Our inference system is based on some assumptions,
which are widely accepted by most researchers in this
field.

A message is a piece of information sent from one
principa1 to another. A message can consist of names of
principals, keys, nonces, or the combination of them.
Compound messages are bracketed using curly braces,
such as (A, No), A compound message consisting more
than two components can’ be understood as nested
compound message. For example, {MI, MZ, M3) is the
abbreviation of ( ( M I , M I ) , M3). A message can be
encrypted or signed with a certain key. An encrypted
message is attached with the key as the subscript. For
example, a message M encrypted with B’s public key can
be written as M , . To gain clarity, we usually add curly
brackets to the encrypted message, such as

3.2

In public cryptosystems, the public key of any
principal is known to ail other principals, while
its private key is initially secret from others.
Formally,

vx.v Y. (KnoW(X,Ky))
In symmetric cryptosystems, the session key
shared between two principals is initially secret
and unknown by all other principals (except the
key server who knows all the keys in the whole
system).

(hf>K,
.

Predicates

0

Several predicates are used in our framework to
describe certain belief and knowledge states.
The predicate Know(X, M ) describes X’s knowledge
state about message M. If X knows that M is true, then
the iogical value of the predicate is true; if X knows that
M is false, then its logical value is false; if X has no
information about the truth of M, then its logical vaiue is
ignorant; if X has both information to conclude that M is
true and false, then its logical value is inconsistent.

There is only one intruder in the network. We
always use I to denote the intruder.
The intruder cannot read an encrypted message
without the corresponding decryption key; i.e.
secret keys are unguessable.

Similarly, the predicate Auth(X, Y, M ) describes X’s
authentication state about Y on message M, that is,
whether message A4 is sent by Y to Xand unmodified.

3.3

The intruder always observes all messages sent
through the network.He tries to use all the keys
he knows to decrypt the messages on’ the
network and send forged messages to others.
He COR also intercept messages sent from one
principal to another, That is, the intruder has the
“full” control over the network.

An honest principal only read information

addressed to him.
A principal never sends messages to himself.

Action functions

Nonces are always different from each other.
A cryptographic protocol can be regarded as a series
of message sending behaviours between different
principals. We introduce action functions to describe this
kind of behaviours. An action h c t i o n Send(X, Y, h4)
means that the principal X sends the message M to
another principal Y.

3.5

Rules

A group of inference rules have been introduced
into our framework to infer new knowledge fiom the old.

5

After a principal receives a message, he will know

All these rules can be divided into the following
categories:

it.
(4) Miscellaneous inference rules

(1) EnrryptionlDecryption rules

4.1 Send(X, Y, M)

-+ Know(X, Iw)

When a principal knows a message and a key, he
can use this key to encrypt (sign) this message and get
the encrypted (signed) message.

If an honest principaI X sends a message M to
another principal Y,she must know the message A4 first.

When a principal knows a message encrypted
(signed) with a key and the reverse of the key, he can use
the reverse of the encryption (signature) key to get the
original message. In public key cryptosystem, the public
and private keys of a principal are reverses of each other.
In symmetric cryptosystem, the reverse of a session key
between two principals is itself (or a simple function of
itself).

I f an honest principal X received a message M,then
there must exist another principal who sent this message
to him (according to one of the assumptions, X cannot
send messages to himself).

4

Modelling Needham-Schroeder public
key protocol

(2) Message combinationlseparation rules
A cryptographic protocol can be modeled as a series

of send action functions, each meaning that a principai
sends a message to another one. Here we take the famous
Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol
as an example, which is often used to demonsttate the
effectiveness of a protocol verification method and
usually regarded as a standard “testbed”.

When a principal knows two messages, he can
know the combination of them.

.-

The original Needham-Schroeder public key
protocol [9] involves seven steps, four of which are
concerning public key distribution procedures. In our
model, all principals’ public keys are open and known to
the entire world. Therefore, the protocol can be
simplified to only three steps [ 5 ] as follows.

When a principal knows the combination of two
messages, he can know them separately. These two rules
can be used inductively to deal with coinpound messages
consisting of more than two components.

(3) Message sending/receiving rules
3.1 Send(X, Y, M)

-+ Rcv(Y, M)

If a principal sends a message to another one, the
object principal will eventually receive it.
3.2 Send(X, Y, M)

+Rcv(1, M )

The aim of this protocol is to establish mutual
authentication between an initiator A and a responder B.
As its name indicates, the protocol uses public key
cryptography.

As one of our assumptions describes, the intruder I
can observe all information flowing over the network.

At the beginning, A composes a fresh nonce No and
sends it to 13 with her own name, encrypted with B’s
public key. After B receives this message, he decrypts it
and then reads the nonce N, and knows who is seeking to
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The authentication property for A can be formalized
as a logic formula need to prove

communicate with him. B then sends back a message
consisting of his own fresh nonce Nb as well as A's nonce
Nu, encrypted with A's public key K, to A. To respond
B's message, A then returns B's nonce Nb to B.
This protocol can be easily modeled as three
message sending actions.

(10)

S W A , B,

( I 1)

RcvIA,

W O ,

i"

-4) 4 )

NI K ,

)

Premise
Premise

We start our inference fiom these two premises.

5

Proving authentication properties

To analyze the Needham-Schroeder public key
protocols, an important property which needs to be
proved is authentication for the principal A, i.e. if A has
used N, to start a run and then receives message {No,
Nb} (from somebody), she will believe that another
principal B really sent the message {Nu,
Nb)

Besides A, we only need to consider two different
principals in the system, namely B and the intruder Z,
according to the assumptions. Therefore there are only
two possibilities for the formula ( I 5 ) : 2 stands for B or I.

to her.

Similarly, the authentication property also needs to be
proved for B.

At the beginning, 'we need to state some
assumptions usefid for the proof: every principal knows
all other's public key, but does not know any private key
except that of himself.

(1 8)

Kjtow(l,

1" NI K ,

14.11(17)

For this formula, we still have two possibilities:

5.1

which does not hold according to the protocol steps, or I
intercept this information from the communication
between A and E, implying

Authentication property for A
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which is exactly the same as the formula (16).

Know(l,{ N b ) K~
There are still two possibilities for it:

(35)

Therefore, we can safely concIude that if A has used
Na to start a run and then receives message {Na,Nb} K , ,

(36)

she will believe that another principal B really sent the
to her.
message {Nn,Nb)

5.2

Nb)

which conflict with assumptions, and
(37)
Rcv(l, I%} Kh
Since it is impossible for B or I itself (according to the
assumptions) to send { N b ] Kh to I, the only possibility is

Authentication property for B

that A sent this message to r, i.e.

The authentication property for B states that if B
receives (Nb)Kc (from somebody) and used Nb, in step 2

(38)

of the protocol, then he can believe that A has sent
{&j Kc to somebody. This property can be similarly

send(A,1, ( N b ] K~

Whichever of formula (33) or (38) holds, we can
always conclude

formalised as:

having proved the authentication property for B.

with two premises:

It should be noticed that the authentication
properties for A and B are not exactly symmetric to each
other. Actually, the original Needham-Schroeder public
key authentication is insecure. The intruder can break the
protocol and impersonate A in the conhunication with
B. Therefore, it cannot be guaranteed that B can believe
A has sent (Nb) c to him if B receives (A$,) c and used
Nb in step 2 of the protocol.

Actually, we can also use our framework to find the
flaw in the protocol. In the above proof, formula (38) and
(34) indicate the possibility that the intruder I
impersonates A. In (38), A may send the secret
information ( N b ) Kh to I, who can in tum send it to B,
impersonating A and befooling B. That is why we can
onIy prove a “weaker” authentication property for B.

According to the assumptions, there are only two
possibilities for the formula (32): D stands for A or 1.

(33)

S e n 4 4 B, IN1 4

1

6

Conclusions and future work

I(32)

In this paper, we have presented a new framework

(34)
Send(z, B, { N b ) K , 1I(32)
If the formula (33) holds, then the authentication
property for B has been proved. If the formula (33) does
not hold, the formula (34) will hold, and then we can get

to prove secure properties for cryptographic protocols.

The framework is a knowledge-based one. We have
introduced notations, predicates, action hnctions and a
number of rules to describe the knowledge and belief
states of principals and the relationships among them.
The rules in our framework give the conditions under
which the knowledge and belief states can be changed,
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and how they can change. We have presented the
proving processes of the authentication properties for the
simplified Needham-Schroeder public key authentication
protocol. These examples show how to use our
framework.

Coiferenee on Computer and Commuriicaiions Security, pp
106-118. ACM Press. 1996.

The examples indicate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the framework. It can prove secure
properties of cryptographic protocols correctly and
efficiently: proving the authentication properties for A
only needs 15 steps, more efficient than the inductive
method, which needs at least six lemmas, each of which
needs three or five steps. Although it is quite efficient to
prove secure properties of small and medium sized
cryptographic protocols, proving large protocols will still
be tedious and time-consuming. Therefore, we need
implement our framework with some proof tools to make
protocol verification an automatic procedure.
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